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ANALOGICAL DESCRIPTIONS OF VARIATION
Royal Skousen
Brigham Young University
The purpose of this paper is to compare two different
approaches to describing linguistic variation.[1]
The first of
these approaches, commonly called structuralist, is the traditional method for describing behavior.
Its methods are found in
many diverse fields -- from biological taxonomy to literary
cl'iticism.
A structuralist description can be broadly characterized as a classificatory system (normally defined as a system of
rules).
The fundamental question that a structuralist description attempts to answer is how a general contextual space should
be split up.
Structuralists have implicitly assumed that
descriptions of behavior should not only be correct, but should
also minimize the number of rules and permit only the simplest
possible contextual specifications.
It turns out that these
intuitive notions can actually be derived from more fundamental
statements about the uncertainty of rule systems.
Hit h ina s t rue t u r ali s t f ram e w0 r' k , vI e can ide n t i f Y t h r e e
fUndamental types of description according to hcw the contextual
space is split up: (1) exceptional versus regular behavior;
(2) catee;orical behavior; and (3) idiosyncratic behavior:
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Problems arise when we try to use rules to predict behavior.
A system of rules partitions the contextual space.
This naturally implies a rule of usage which permits one and only one rule
to apply to any given fully-specified context.
When we use this
rule of usage, the contextual partitioning forces an exact
demarcation in pr'edicted behavior as we move across the contextual space from one rule context to another.
Consider the
predicted behavior for our three fundamental types of description; in each case we get abrupt. distinct shifts in behavior:
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Yet in all three of tbese cas~~,' evidence r~~"llifnguage
belJ:wior indicates that transitioN ~<;lrosS the cont~iv,\.HI'1 space
are gradual and probabilistic:
'
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EXCEPTIONAL
VERSUS REGULAR

IDIOSYNC,l~ATlC

CATEGORICAL

Asan e x amp 1 e • con sid e r the welI - k n ow n res u 1 t s. ,t,t' p ,r c e p t u a 1
tc';ts between voiced and voiceless stops which s~w{a'gradual
shifting towards the voiced stops as voicing o~~et time is
increased:[2]
1 0 0 - - - - - - - - - - ....
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correct
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Or consider Labov's semantic experiment in which he"fl~~that as
the relative width of a cup-like object is i nc reased;;tt~"grea te r
the chances speakers will identif~ the cup -1 i k' :ab Je e t a s a
bowl:[3]
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Similarly. evidence from linguistic behavior shows that
forms close to exceptional items may occasionall~ behave like
those exceptions.
Consider, for instance, repeated mlsspellings
SllCh as GREAD for grade. [4] which is apparently ~acu~(j on the
exceptional spelling of the word great.
A similar ex.allQte is the
spelling INCHOIR for lng,u1r~. obviously based on tRe uniquelyspelled word cbQ1t.[5]
Johnson and Venezk~ have provided
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examples of synthetic English words taking on exceptional
vronuncjations when these made-up wor'ds are close to certain
exceptionally-spelled words.
For example. PLOOD was frequently
pronounced wi th the IA/
vowel (as in the exceptionally spelled
but ver'y similar words blood and floQd).
Similarly. THEAT wa~;
frequently pronounced with the
IE/
vowel (as in the word
UU:,(l.Q...t. a vel' y .s i mil a r for m) . [ 6 ]
The sam e e f f e c t has bee n
ot):H~l'ved
in studie:.; of word formation.
For' inslaf)ee, I hClvl'
,'ecorcled incort'ect plural forms such as aAJU) (for ~), which is
obviously based an the exceptional plural ~.
Another difficulty with rule approaches is that without
adJitional interpretations of how to use the rules, we cannot
make predictions about behavior when a given context is deviant
i
some way or when crucial contextual information is missing.
Yet there is abundant evidence from language usage that we can
interpret improperly-formed contexts, such as slips of the tongue
and ungrammatical sentences, including most of the starred
sentences constructed by linguists.
In addition, we can usually
understand nan-native and dialectal speech, proving these speech
types are reasonably close to our own.
'j

We can also use redundant information to predict outcomes
\,'!len normally expected information is missing.
Consider the
following partially-obscured word from McClelland and Rumelhart: [7]

WDR~

Even though the final letter is partially covered. it is obvious
from what is given that the word must by ~, not \i.Ql:.d nor the
impossi~le~.
Similarly, we can usually delete all the vowels
from sentences of English without totally impairing our ability
to understand what is intended, as in the following passage from
Chomsky:[8]
Th* pro*bl*m fIr th* lInguIst, *s will *s fir th*
child l**rn*ng th* l*ngu*g*, *s t* d*t*rm*n* fr*m
th* d*t* *f p*rf*rm*nc* th* *nd*rl**ng s*st*m *f
rIlls th*t his b**n m*st*r*d b* th* sp**k*r-h**r*r
*nd th*th* pits t* *s* *n *ct**l p*rf*rm*nc*.

,
~

I

'I

1

I

Traditionally, linguistic analyses have been based on the
idea that language is a system of rules. Saussure, of course, is
well-known as an early proponent of linguistic structuralism.
Yet linguistic structuralism did not originate with Saussure -nor did it end with "American structuralism".
The neogrammarian
approach to historical change is clearly structuralist.
And it
must be recognized that Chomsky himself is a structuralist ~
t=..AQ.dJ,ence.
His attack against the American structuralists was
not an attack against structuralism ~. but instead was an
attack against the methodological assumptioris that these linguists had espoused.
For Chomsky (and virtually all other
linguists today) there is no doubt that language is rule-governed
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and that language behavior must be accounted for in terms of
expJicit rules.
As a corollary, language acquisition is viewed
as learning rules and language change as a change in the rules.
Within the structuralist framework, linguists have usually
operated under the hypothesis that language rules are deterministic.
Cases of val'iation have long been recognized, but until
,'airly recently these cases were vaguely identified as "free
var!ation", a term which essentially meant that the behavior was
l1on-d et.ermi n i s tic.
Labov and his co-workers have prov ided many
examples of language variation which cannot be reduced to
det~rministic explanation.
The question no longer is whether
ttJpre is probabilistic behavior in language.
Instead the
qu stion is: How do we account for this behavior? Following the
traditional assumption that language is rule-governed, Labov has
proposed that variable rules be used to account for probabilistic
behavior. [9] Yet there are some serious conceptual difficul ties
with variable rules.
As I see it, there are two specific problems that have
arisen in the study of language variation. One is the assumption
that multiple-factor effects are simple mathematical functions of
single factors. [10] This is, of course, a very specific assumption and one wonders whether there is much empirical evidence
from language learning for such an underlying separation of
variables.
This assumption also .explains the lack of reference
to standard statistical approaches (such as discrete multivariate
analysis) which directly consider the possibility of multiple
effects.
The second specific problem follows from the first; namely,
the question of which model (additive, multiplicative non-application, or multiplicative application) fits the data best -- or,
equivalently, which parameters should be assigned to a logistic
model.[11]
There appears to be little evidence for a principled
basis on which to choose the appropriate model.
But there are also two general problems that have arisen in
variation theory.
One is the status of probabiJ ities in the
model -- do they actually exist? and if so, how are they learned
from the statistics and then used to predict behavior? Many have
argued that the probabilities do not in fact exist, but this
still leaves us with the question of what does account for the
probabi I i s tic behav ior. [ 12]
But probably the most serious problem is the seemingly
unlimited number of variables (linguistic as well as social) that
affect any given non-deterministic phenomenon in language.
In
other Hords, there seems to be no end to the va ria t i on.
Th is
reminds one of the well-known suspicion in statistics that
completely independent variables are rare, that given enough data
almost any two variables can be shown to be dependent to some
degree.
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As a specific example of this problem. consider Guy's
discussion of final It.d/ deletion in English. [13]
Guy first
ljsts Labov's three main linguistic variables that affect the
pro b a b iIi t Y 0 f fin a 1 ..1 t • d / del e t ion.
Or i gin ally. Lab 0 vas s i g n ed
two variants to two of these linguistic variables and ignored the
lesser effect of the third:

e1>

~JlllU~t1cal conditioning:
monornorpllemic or bimorphemic?

(2)

~itiooing

(3)

CQDaitioning by preceding segment
~pecified in Labov's original study]

Is the word

by following segment:
segment a vowel or a non-vowel?

Is the
[not

Over the years additional studies have shown that each of these
variables should be assigned more variants -- that additional
distinctions are necessary if we want to account for empirically
significant effects on final It.dl deletion.
Guy partitions
these three variables more finely:
(1)

grammatical conditioning:
Is the word
monomorphemic, the past tense of an ambiguous
verb. or the past tense of a regular weak
verb?

(2)

c.QJlditioning by fQllowing segment:
Is the
segment a consonant, a glide. a liquid, a
vowel. or a pause?

(3)

~LQruL:Lt.i.Q.njJ.uLby

preceding segment:
Is the
segment a sibilant, a non-sibilant fricative,
a nasal, a stop, or a lateral?

So from an original 4-way distinction we now have a potential
distribution of 75 possibilities (3'5·5 = 75).
But this is not all.
Other variables have been discovered
that affect the probability of final It,dl deletion:
lexical
stress, rate of speech, length of consonant cluster, articulatory
complexity of clusters, speech style. and social factors (such as
age, sex, social class, race, geographic background, and so on).
Guy rightly observes that this rule of final It,d/ deletion
shows that "variation is inherent, and cannot be scrubbed out of
our linguistic description by ever-finer subdivisions of the
data." [14]
In other words, final It,d/ deletion cannot be
reduced to deterministic phenomena.
But the history of this
example also implies that final It,dl deletion cannot be correctly described eitherl
There doesn't seem to be any limit to the
number of variants that affect final /t,d/ deletion.
As more
dat~ is collected, more distinctions are discovered.
The effect
of these additional variants is less important. but they are
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3till statistically ::Jignificant.
It appeal's as if no simple
COIT€ct description of final It.dl deletion is forthcoming.
In
attempting to describe non-deterministic phenomena optimally. we
wDl have to sacrifice minimality in order to achieve correctness.

This example seems to point to the following conclusion -that 41timately the correct description may have a separate rule
for every Qifferent set of conditions.
Taken to its logical
conclusion, this would mean that each rule would represent a
~ingle occurrence since no two occurrences are completely
identical.
In other words. instead of representing types of
occurrence. rules would represent tokens of occurrence.
In the second part of this paper this idea will be developed
as an alternative to structuralist descriptions.
In fact. the
notion of rule will be abandoned in favor of an analogical
approach that avoids the conceptual difficulties of rule
approaches.
Instead of trying to predict behavior by using a
system of rules (probabilistic or otherwise). an analogical
description predicts behavior by means of a collection of
examples called the analogical ~et.
Given a context x. we construct the analogical set for x by looking through the data for
(1)

classes of examples that are most similar to x.
and

(2)

more general classes of examples which behave like
those examples most similar to x.

In order to show how to construct the analogical set for a
given context. let us consider final stop deletion once more.
Suppose we are interested in predicting final stop deletion when
we are given the context vws -- that is, when the final stop is
not followed by a vowel (v). is not word-final (w). and is
preceded by a sonorant (s). For this given context. we construct
a hierarchy of supracontexts by systematically eliminating the
factors v. w. and s.
For each of these supracontexts we also
determine the number of times the final stop is deleted and the
number of times it is retained:[151
vws

(21.4)

(28.9)

(80.67)

(172.198)
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\-1t~ next le:;t e~lch of these supracontexts for homor,eneity.
11
;;upr'acontext is homogeneous providing all its subcontexts (as
d~fined by the given context) behave alike.
Using a statistical
procedure that. I will explain momentarily, we obtain the following results for this hierarchy of supracontexts:

(1)

The given context (vws) is by definition
homoseneous since it has no subcontexts.

(2)

There are two supracontexts that are statistically homogeneous: vws and v-so

(3)

Two suprac~ntexts_ are statistically heterogeneous: -ws and v--.
These supracontexts
have been circled.

(~)

If a supracontext is statistically heterogeneous, then all supracontexts containing that
supracontext are automatically considered
heterogeneous.
In our hierarchy there are
three such inclusively heterogeneous supracontexts:
-w-, --s, and ---. These supracontexts are enclosed by boxes.

Now the analogical set is formed by all the occurrences from
each homogeneous supracontext.
In our example we obtain 131
occurrences, of which 113 involve final stop deletion:
vws

21

4

vw-

34

6

v-s

58

14

113

24

In order to predict behavior, we posit a rule of usage called
~ndom §election:
Randomly select one occurrence from the analogical set
and use it as a model for predicting behavior.
With this rule of usage, we obtain the probability that the final
stop will be deleted when the given context is vws:
P(deletionlvws)

= 113/131

~

0.825

But the question still remains:
How do we statistically
determine whether a supracontext and its subcontexts behave
alike. Traditionally, in using a statistical test, we must know
either the underlying probability distribution for the test or a
distribution that approximates the actual distribution.
In this
paper. I use a natural statistic called the
rate of agreement
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that avoid~, tbis problem.
If we have a context with no occurrences of each outcome Wi' with
n = L. ni occurrences lin all.
then the rate of agreement is defined as

t

=

_'0.L
n-1

n 0(n 0-1 )/2
1

1

Usin£ this statistic, our decision procedure for testing homogeneity of behavior turns out to be very simple:
Always try to increase the rate of agreement.
To show how this works. consider the following array of data
p-rived from our hierarchy of supracontexts:
vws

-ws

21

4

25

7

5

12

28

9

37

I

For each context we calculate the rate of agreement:
vws

(1/24)[21'20 + 4'3]/2

[vws]

=

(1/11)[7'6 + 5'4]/2

-ws

9

2.818

<1/36)[28'27 + 9'8]/2

=

11.5

Since the two subcontexts (vws and vws) form a partition on the
supracontext (-ws). we sum up the rat~s of agreement for the two
subcontexts and compare that sum with the rate of agreement for
the supracontext:
.1~

= J<vws) +
9

+

J(vws)
2.818

-

](-ws)
11. 5

0.318

Since we always try to increase the rate of agreement. we have
the following decision procedure:
If

~J

> a. then the array is statistically heterogeneous.

If

~~

<

a.

then the array is statistically homogeneous.

Therefore. our sample array is statistically heterogeneous.
This statistical procedure is very simple.
It never
requires us to calculate probabilities or use an approximate
distribution to estimate those probabilities.
Another advantage

IilO

is that it is parameter-free.
Its level of significance is
asymptotically less than one half. but nonetheless fairly close
to one half.
This of course means that this test is very
powerful.
From a decision point of view this procedure can be
defended in that it equally favors heterogeneity and homogeneity
-- unlike traditional statistical procedures which strongly favor
homogeneity.
(It also turns out that we can redefine this
~tatistical test so that decisions are made at smaller levels of
significance.)
This procedure is also biased towards deterministic predictions of behavior. especially under certain well-defined conditions; namely.
(1)

when the number of occurrences is low; or

(2)

when imperfect memory reduces the number of
occurrences.

This biasedness towards deterministic predictions helps explain
several well-known observations about language variation; for
example.
(1)

the historical tendency to replace synchronic
language variation by deterministic behavior;
and

(2)

the historical tendency to split up a fairly
frequent non-deterministic context into a
class of deterministic contexts.

In addition. deterministic behavior is favored whenever there is
a need to maximize utility (that is. maximize rewards or minimize
losses).
Under such conditions a different rule of usage called
selection by plurality is used:
Select the outcome which occurs most frequently in the
anaJogical set and predict that the given context will
take that outcome.
In order to compare this analogical approach to a rule
8pproach. let us consider an example of morphological variation
from Finnish. In Finnish certain bisyllabic verb stems ending in
[non-obstruent] [dental stop] [low vowell
take imperfect forms ending in tJ or~.
Some of these verbs
take only ti. some only ~. and others can take either ending but
with different degrees of acceptability (depending on the
particular verb).
The contextual space for this class of verbs
can be split up into four distinct categories according to the
length of the vocalic portion (either short V or long VV) and
whether or not the syllable ends in a consonant C:
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V
VV
VC
VVC

pit~~,

tietl!l§,

vet~§,

it~§

16yt§§, hoitaa, huutaa, .••
murtaa, ylt§§, kyntl!l§, sortaa
myBnt§§, k§§nt~§. piirt§§. kielt§§. kiertl!l§.
pyyt§~,

lent~§,

The 1c:st category. VVC. is statistically deterministic since it
only takes the ~.l outcome (in the standard language). An optimal
struuturalist d~scription of this class of verbs would at least
combine all the verbs in the VVC category into a single rule.
S~ch a rule would predict that a verb like viertaa. would take
tne ending ;U. in the imperfect.
In contrast to the rule
approqch, consider the analogical set for vi~rtaa (based on
st3tistics from Tuomi's statistical analysis of standard
Fil,nish):[161
distance
from
yj"ertaa
0
1
2

3

verb
vierta§
kiert§§
piirUi§
s 11 rt§§
kielt§a
rient§§
viil t§§
py6rt§§
kiilt~§

4

5

v§§nUi§
murtaa
sortaa
huoltaa
juontaa
kuultaa
klH!ntlH'i
muuntaa
n'yontaa
puoltaa
ty5ntaa
aantaa

verb
frequency
U
~
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0

a
a
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
16
24
8
22
8
1
4
1
1
6
0
1
1
1
26
1
30
1
10
1

number of
homogeneous
supracontexts
38
22
14
14
10
10
12
6
6
4
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1

frequencies in
analogical set

tJ.

~

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
352
336
112
220
80
12
24
6
4
12

2

1301

probabil i ty
of random
selection
.270
.258
.086
.169
.061
.009
.018
.005
.003
.009
.002
.002
.002
.002
.040
.002
.046
.002
.015
.001

a

2
2
2
52
2
60
2
20
1

P(silviertaa)

~

.9985

We first observe that the predicted behavior for viertAA
looks rul e-gov erned.
In the analogical approach the p red ic ted
probability for the ~ outcome is very close to one. the value
that an optimal rule description of the data would predict.
But we also note that the analogical approach is. in a
sensE;, messy:
it permi ts the verbs murtea and ruu:iu (which do
not have the same syllabic structure as viertaa) to affect the
predicted outcome.
In contrast to an optimal rule approach. the
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ann)('eical description allows a slight "leakage" in favor of the
t j outcome.
The analogical approach also assigns probabilities to
particular proportional analogies. The preferred analogy is. in
the case of yiertaa, a rhyming analogy:
kiert~~

kiersi ::

viert~~

vien,i

This analogy occurs 27J of the time.
Rhyming analogies tend to
be fairly significant. especially when the given context is
non-odcurring.
But we must keep in mind that the analogical
arproach does not necessarily prefer rhyming analogies:
the
o~currence of such analogies depends on whether rhyming contexts
are homogeneous in behavior.
This example also shows that the effect of a particular verb
depends upon three factors:
(1)

the amount of similarity between the verb and
the given context;

(2)

the frequency of the verb; and

(3)

the number of homogeneous supracontexts that
the verb occurs in (or, equivalently, the
extensiveness of the homogeneity).

These same multiple analogical effects were noticed by Johnson
and Venezky in their study of speakers' pronunciation of unfamiliar words:[17]
A model that might provide a higher degree of predictabil i ty ••• is a final consonant model [in essence, a
rhyming model] based on token counts rather than on
type counts. This model would be especially effective
if the final consonant influence derives from analogy
with a few high frequency words rather than from a
generalization based on all real words that contain a
particular spelling.
This model is, of course. compatible with an analogical approach
based on frequency of occurrence.
In many cases (like this one) the predicted behavior is
nearly the same no matter which approach is used. but conceptually the two approaches are quite different:
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HUI.F APPROACH
a system of rules
based on types of behavior
contextual space is partitioned
global, macroscopic
must learn rules from the data
~;t(ltic,
rieid
usage: find the npplicable rule
must specify how rules interact
well-defined boundaries
shal'p, precise transitions
rule-governed
pr;dictions made by rules alone
explicit, direct

ANALOGICAL APPROACH
equivalent to the original data
based on tokens of behavior
contextual space remains atomistic
local. microscopic
need for large memory capacity
dynamic. flexible
usage: find an appropriate example
must be able to access data quickly
no boundaries directly defined
gradual. fuzzy transit~ons
appears to be rule-governed
predictions only for given contexts
implicit. indirect

Many of these same distinctions are found in Winograd's terms
"declarative" versus "procedural".[18] This distinction seems to
be particularly reI evant in explaining language performance. as
has been pOinted out by Rumelhart:[19)
Perhaps the classical case of using knowledg~ hQ~
(procedural knowledge) to produce knQwledge that
(factual knowledge) occurs in the domain of grammatical
judgements.
The knowledge that we have about language
seems to be largely embedded in the procedures involved
in the production and comprehension of linguistic
utterances.
This is evidenced by the relative ease
with which we perform these tasks when compared with
our ability to explicate the knowledge involved in
them.
Semantic knowledge would appear to be the same.
Whereas we can quickly interpret sentences. it is only
with the most painstaking effort that we can produce
definitions of terms with any generality.
Despi te these arguments. both empirical and conceptual. in
favor of an analogical approach to the description of language
(as well as other forms of behavior). there is a place for
structuralism too.
Structuralist descriptions are properly used
to describe actually-occurring behavior.
An optimal structuralist description serves as a kind of meta-language that efficiently describes past behavior and allows us to talk about that
behavior.
Whenever we attempt to summarize behavior or to
discover relationships in data, our viewpoint is structuralist.
But if we wish to predict behavior rather than just describe it.
it may be necessary to abandon structuralist approaches in favor
of an atomistic one.

l
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NOTES

1

This paper is based on my forthcoming book Analogy and
Strycture.

2

Abramson and Lisker 1972:19.

J

Labov 1973:354.356.

4

Gates 1937:72.

5

lowe this example to material provided by Thomas D. Horn.

6

Johnson and Venezky 1976:262.

7

McClelland and Rumelhart 1980. part 1:24.

8

Chomsky 1965:4.

9

Labov 1969:737-739.

10

Cedergren and Sankoff 1974:335-336.

11

Rousseau and Sankoff 1978:57-58.62.

12

Cf. Fasold 1978 for a discussiori of this problem.

13

Guy 1980:5-10.

14

Guy 1980:11.

15

For the statistics, cf. Fasold 1978:92.

16

Tuomo Tuomi, statistical analysis of approximately 600.000
words of text from 1975-76 issues of Syornen Kyyalebti
(available on microfiche).

17

Johnson and Venezky 1976:266.

18

Winograd 1975:185-191.

19

Rumelhart 1979:2-3.
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